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ESSAYS
THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM COMES TRUE-
A CRIMINAL LAW PROFESSOR BECOMES
JUROR # 7*
Stacy Caplow*
INTRODUCTION
When it first arrived, the jury summons to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York felt
like a joke. With my resume, set forth in detail below, each
entry of which arguably provides a basis for a peremptory
challenge, what remotely sensible or competent lawyer would
ever want me as a juror, particularly on a criminal case? The
joke quickly transformed into an exciting long shot, an
improbable opportunity.
Now that the elimination of professional exemptions for
jury service' allows for routine participation on New York
* @2002 Stacy Caplow. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, Brooklyn Law School.
With appreciation to Brooklyn Law School's Summer Research Stipend Program and
gratitude to Gene Cerruti, and my "buddies" Susan Herman, Nan Hunter, Minna
Kotkin, and Liz Schneider. I also would like to thank the lead prosecutor and the
defense attorney for speaking with me so frankly and graciously after the trial, and,
most of all, for not bumping me from the jury.
1 Almost 100 years ago, the Supreme Court held that exclusion of certain
professions from state jury service exemptions does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906). Federal law does not specifically
exempt lawyers, 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (West 1994), but permits each judicial district to
formulate its own plan which might excuse groups or occupational classes if such a
plan would neither interfere with the fair cross section requirement (§ 1861), nor
discriminate on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status
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juries not only of lawyers, but even judges, the Governor of
New York State, and the Mayor of New York City,2 what trial
lawyer has not fantasized about being inside the jury room,
that domain of mystery and speculation? Trial lawyers devote
considerable energy and attention to selecting and persuading
a jury, second guessing the decision to exercise a challenge,
divining what jurors are thinking by examining every
expression of facial or body language, and guessing which of
those impassive faces masks a sympathetic listener. Even
though many researchers are intrigued by and have made
many assumptions and assertions about the psychology and
process of jury deliberation, how jurors see, hear, and evaluate
evidence and argument, how subjective or personal factors
affect decision making, and whether jurors understand the
judge's instructions,3 the process is still clandestine and the
research is often based on simulated jury deliberation. The
(§ 1862). Many state statutes contain professional exemptions for lawyers. See
generally, Michael P. Sullivan, Annotation, Jury: Who is Lawyer or Attorney
Disqualified or Exempt from Service, or Subject to Challenge for Cause, 57 A.L.R. 4
1260 (2001). Sections 511 and 512 of the N.Y. STATE JUDICIARY LAW, exempting many
categories of professionals and disqualifying elected official and judges from jury
service, were repealed effective January 1, 1996. A judge who sits in the Criminal
Term of the Supreme Court of the State of New York told me that in recent years there
has been a lawyer on almost every one of his juries.
2 James Barron, Public Lives: Seeking a View on the Other Side, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1999, at B2 (describing New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye's
second tour of duty as a potential juror); Lynette Holloway, Pataki is Summoned for
Jury Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at B2; Dan Janison, City Briefing-A Report on
People and Issues in City Government: Big Fish Enter Pool-Pols et al. Called to Serve
on Juries, NEWSDAY, Apr. 14, 1997, at A14; Robert D. McFadden, Court Surprise:
Giuliani Picked as Juror No. 1, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1999, at Al; David Rhode, One
Angry Man; What's the Verdict When the Mayor Is Also Jury Foreman?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1999, § 4, at 6; David Rhode, Mayor is Praised as Just Another Juror, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999, at B3; Janney Scott, Line of Work Ma'am? Chief Judge, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1996, at B3.
3 See generally A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH (Walter F. Abbott & John
Batt eds., 1999) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. See also JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY (1987); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR,
JUDGING THE JURY (1986); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); MICHAEL J.
SAKS & REID HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 47-71 (1978); DONALD E. VINSON
& DAVID S. DAVIS, JURY PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STATEGIES & TRIAL TECHNIQUES
(1996); Robert K Bothwell, Social Cognition in the Courtroom: Juror Information
Processing and Story Construction, in HANDBOOK, supra, at 17-1-17-45; Joan B.
Kessler, Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 69-
89 (Rita James Simon ed., 1975); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory
of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991).
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opportunity to be one of those people about whom there is so
much theorizing was tantalizing. But like Tantalus, I feared
that the no longer forbidden fruit I craved still would be
frustratingly elusive given what I assumed would be well-
warranted skepticism about my capacity to be impartial (there
were reasons for either side to presume a predisposition or
bias), or my ability to function with the same degree of
openness and impressionability as the rest of the jurors.
Although I had postponed jury duty until classes were
over, I groused that it was bound to be a waste of two weeks.4 I
would never get picked. But, I was!-to the amazement of
family, friends, colleagues, students, and indeed everyone I
told. All week I received comments such as: "You're kidding!"
"Who would want you on a jury?" Even though people who
know me well thought that my selection was preposterous (Did
this reaction reflect on their perception of my inability to be
fair? I won't go there!), three lawyers (two for the government
and one for the defense) were willing to take the risk.
Meet juror # 7 in the case of United States v. Richard
Lyon,5 a four-day marijuana distribution conspiracy trial. My
original expectation of a few days reading a book in the central
jury room turned into a remarkable opportunity to engage with
the criminal justice system from a totally new perspective.6
Over the next four days, this experience, which I entered into
with a certain detachment, like an observer at an experiment
or a participant in a diverting academic exercise, evolved into a
real moral responsibility, one which kept me awake the night
before our deliberations. The verdict was followed by endless
questions from friends, family, and students. Most commonly, I
4 Jury service in the Eastern District of New York ("EDNY") is made
somewhat less onerous by a telephone alert system. During my first week, I appeared
on Monday, along with a huge crowd of other potential jurors, many of whom were
selected for one of the four cases or the grand jury scheduled for that day. Since I was
not picked, I was excused until the following Monday when only one jury trial was
starting.
5 To protect their privacy I have changed the names of all of the participants,
or I simply refer to them by role.
6 Ironically, I have never been treated with more deference in a courtroom.
This judge, who repeatedly thanks the jury for being so punctual, has everyone stand
each time the jury enters or leaves the courtroom as a sign of respect for the judges of
the facts.
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heard a wistfulness and even envy from other lawyers who all
seemed to say, "I would love to be on a jury."
What is so intriguing about jury service, especially since
so many people try to avoid it? What makes a lawyer-juror, and
even more so a law professor-juror, such a curiosity? Could the
answers to some of the questions I was asked offer any new
information or insights?
Having been privileged to participate in a normally
confidential phenomenon, a thrilling and fascinating
experience, connected to so many ideas I have taught or
encountered as a practicing attorney, my destiny was
inescapable. And, as a clinical law teacher, who preaches that
experience should be followed by reflection, it would be
unforgivable to squander an opportunity to probe such a rich
subject, especially since the trial was held at the beginning of a
summer free of classroom responsibilities. Although jury duty
has been a fertile topic for other commentators,7 I write to
share my perceptions with the eager, inquisitive audience of
juror-wannabees and voyeurs. My reflections might shine just
a bit more light into the off-limits jury room and offer
additional anecdotal evidence to more serious students of the
jury trial process.8
Insider accounts of jury service are not uncommon and often are considered
desirable windows into a usually invisible process. Lawyers speak to jurors for
feedback. Jurors in sensational cases occasionally write, or more likely talk, about the
case, a form of profiteering and grandstanding that is often criticized. See, e.g., Marcy
Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & PoLY REV. 389, 391-95 (1994). Occasionally,
a thoughtful juror will write about the experience. See, e.g., D. GRAHAM BURNErr, A
TRIAL BY JURY (2001); William Finnegan, Doubt, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 31, 1994, at
48. Law teachers seem markedly drawn to writing about jury service as an opportunity
to extrapolate broader themes. See, e.g., Donald H. Cook, How I Spent My Sabbatical,
or What Happens When A Torts Professor Is a Juror in A Negligence Case, 14 REV.
LITIG. 219 (1994); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The 'Uncomplicated" Law of Products
Liability: Reflections of a Professor Turned Juror, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1082 (1997);
Richard H. McAdams, A View from the Box: The Law Professor as Juror, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. (1992); Stephen Shapiro, A Law Professor's View from the Jury Box, 26 U.
BALT. L.F. 41 (1996); Mary Pat Truhart, A Summer's Tale: Of Marriage, Feminism,
and Jury Duty, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 292 (1996).
8 The public has almost no opportunity to see the inner workings of a real jury.
There have been two television shows in which cameras were permitted to film
deliberations. The first, Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, filmed by Professor Stephen
J. Herzberg of University of Wisconsin Law School, aired on PBS on April 8, 1986. The
other, Enter the Jury Room, was shown on CBS on April 16, 1997. For a discussion of
both shows, see generally William R. Bagley, Jr., Jury Room Secrecy, 32 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 481 (1999). On the other hand, jury trial movies are legion. From the classic 12
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"What are you planning to write about?" I was asked by
the prosecutors and defense attorney after contacting them
about my intentions. My goal is not to critique the lawyers'
skills, to second guess the verdict, to tell a personal tale of
revelation, or to pontificate about the criminal justice system.
Instead, I intend to identify some of the common beliefs,
assumptions, and questions raised about the jury trial process
generally, and attempt to relate my experiences to these
concerns.
I. THE CASE-IN-BRIEF
None of my observations will make any sense without
some understanding of the case on trial. Although a relatively
simple trial-one defendant, two counts-with uncomplicated
facts, there was enough personality, factual complexity, and
lively testimony to keep jurors interested and engaged. Despite
my intention to keep the description minimalist, even such a
straightforward case, involving seven witnesses and lasting
only three and one-half days, requires a certain amount of
detail in order to understand the jury dynamics and the
questions that I intend to address.9 Moreover, the power of
narrative, the pull of facts, is irresistible. This was a good
story, and, for four days, I was swept up in its force. And, as
any trial lawyer would admit, you can never tell what fact will
impress or influence the jury. So, forgive the length of this
section, but, at the very least, the details will enable readers to
see the case as if from the jury box.
ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957) to the suspenseful THE JUROR (Columbia Pictures
1996) to the comedic JURY DUTY (Tristar 1995), filmgoers can see fictionalized juries on
a regular basis.
9 This is an opportune time to make some disclaimers. First, although I had
access to the transcript of the testimony, including the bench conferences, and spoke
with the lawyers so that I now have some additional information to supplement my
impressions from the jury box, there are some aspects of the case I still do not know,
particularly those relating to pretrial motions. Also, what I did glean from those post-
trial conversations is, I am sure, very superficial. Finally, I forewarn that this is my
narrative of the evidence that, as I now reconstruct the story, represents only one
juror's recollection of the facts and reactions to the witnesses. My recitation clearly
contains values, attitudes, and judgments which mirror my assessment of the evidence
during the trial and the deliberations. In order to clarify the narrative, I have footnoted
some of these points even though the rest of the jury was unaware of both the
background facts and my perceptions at the time.
20021
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The two-count indictment charges Richard Lyon, a
young, well-dressed, composed, black man, sitting at counsel
table, with participating in a conspiracy to distribute
thousands of pounds of marijuana and with possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. At the government table,
two Assistant United States Attorneys ("AUSAs") are seated
with the lead Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA') agent
assigned to the case.
The case begins in California where a large scale
operation to ship huge quantities of marijuana across the
country had its headquarters. The government's brief opening
statement reveals that the conspiracy involved a
transcontinental scheme in which large cardboard boxes of
marijuana were shipped from California to New York via
Federal Express, with the complicity of Fed Ex employees. The
defendant, and many of the co-conspirators, worked for Fed Ex.
The prosecutor's main point is the scale of the conspiracy,
underscoring the quantity of drugs involved-between 250-
2,500 pounds a day. As the AUSA says, "This is not about some
kid smoking a joint."
The defense opening unpacks the theory of its case: the
defendant did not know that the boxes he transported
contained marijuana. The opening promises that this claim will
be established by the weaknesses in the government's
evidence. Although the defendant apparently suspected that
there was something illegal contained in the boxes, probably
guns, he claims to have been unaware of the nature of their
contents. The jury would hear a tape of his conversation with a
co-conspirator suggesting that he thought the boxes might
contain guns.
The government's case consists of five witnesses. The
first, an investigator from Fed Ex, educates the jury in
substantial detail about how packages are routed through Fed
Ex. Back in the jury room, the jurors joke that, between her
testimony and the movie Cast Away,"0 we could never look at a
Fed Ex truck the same. This witness introduces the records of
the one delivery in which the defendant was involved. Her
testimony concedes that a lot of contraband, in addition to
drugs, is shipped via Fed Ex.
10 CAST AWAY (Twentieth Century Fox 2000).
[Vol. 67: 3
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In this conspiracy, which ultimately netted more than
twenty-five defendants, narcotics were shipped out of a Fed Ex
drop point in California to fictitious companies at real New
York City addresses. The scheme required insiders in Fed Ex
to create bogus shipping labels, and other employees to pick up
boxes at the New York City sort location that would then be
intercepted on the street by another member of the conspiracy.
The courier would complete the records of the transaction as if
a genuine delivery had taken place.
The next witness, a cooperator named John Cain, the
Fed Ex driver who had recruited the defendant to help him
with a larger than normal size shipment of boxes, had pled
guilty-twice. This cooperator is the link between the
conspiracy and the defendant, and offers the only proof that
the defendant knew the contents of the boxes. Yet, Cain balks
at definitively establishing the defendant's knowledge. He
testified at one point, "I tell him it was drugs." But when asked
"Did you tell him what sort of drugs?" he replied, "I didn't know
myself."" He also describes a conversation that took place after
the delivery in which they commented on how heavy the boxes
were, speculating about what was inside, and "assuming" that
it was marijuana because of the weight.
On cross-examination, the defense establishes the
details of the cooperation agreement, notably that the
cooperator had pled guilty earlier in the case without a
cooperation agreement so that his anticipated sentencing
guidelines were between twenty-four and thirty months. 12 His
subsequent guilty plea, entered only a few days before the trial,
risked a longer, mandatory minimum prison sentence but
carried with it the possibility of a "substantial assistance"
" Quotes from the testimony are based not only on my recollection but also on
the transcript. (on file with author). Since this is not an appellate brief, I will not cite
to specific pages or lines.
12 This is an example of when my knowledge of the law was clearly greater
than the rest of the jurors, none of whom had heard of the Federal Sentencing
guidelines before. They did not, however, have any problem understanding the main
point: the cooperators were likely to receive a substantial benefit from their testimony.
Moreover, they understood that if the defendant was convicted, he faced a more severe
sentence than either of these two co-conspirators, both of whom were considerably
more involved in the scheme than the defendant.
2002]
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letter 3 and a recommendation against deportation to Haiti. 4
The balance of the cross-examination exposes the witness's
lack of candor. He is evasive and contentious. Also, according to
the DEA reports of earlier debriefings with the prosecutors, he
had not mentioned the defendant's awareness of the contents
prior to his arrest.
The third witness is a DEA agent who, about eight
months before the defendant's one delivery, had intercepted a
shipment that was supposed to be part of the same conspiracy.
He identifies the driver of the Fed Ex truck as John Little, a
major player in the scheme, who the jury would hear from later
that day as the second cooperator. The agent observed Little
remove a large quantity of boxes from his Fed Ex truck which
were loaded onto a van. The DEA followed that van, and
arrested the driver, seizing twenty boxes, each of which
weighed between thirty and fifty pounds. This testimony is
critical to establishing the duration of the conspiracy and the
total weight of the marijuana involved.
During this agent's testimony, the jury is treated to
some visual aids: blow ups of mug shots of some of the other
conspirators, pictures of twenty-seven seized cartons packed
with compressed bricks of marijuana. Two or three bricks
would be wrapped into a bale of bubble wrap and dryer paper
" United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") § 5K1.1. Unlike the other
jurors, I know what this type of letter looks like. The judge's instruction on this point
stated:
[Y]ou have heard testimony about what has been referred to as a
5K1.1 letter. Since November 1, 1987, sentencing in federal courts in
the United States is governed by statutorily mandated sentencing
Guidelines. That means that federal judges are required to impose
sentences between a minimum and maximum number of months
determined by the nature of the offense for which sentence is being
imposed and the history of the offender. One section of these
Guidelines, § 5K1.1, provides that upon a motion by the government
stating that a defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed a
crime, the court may depart from the guidelines. . .. [Tihe final
determination as to the sentence to be imposed rests with the court
whether or not a § 5K1.1 motion is made.
14 This is another example of some tangential legal knowledge that I brought
to the trial. Having been teaching an immigration law clinic for four years, a fact that
never came out on voir dire, I was well aware of the consequences of a conviction of a
narcotics crime and knew that these witnesses entertained false hopes of avoiding
removal (deportation) even with a recommendation from the prosecutor. I.N.A. § 237
(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (West 1999).
[Vol. 67: 3
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(to camouflage the odor). Each box contains two bales. We also
are shown the contents of one of the bales which the agent cuts
open while the lawyers are at side bar. For a brief moment
before the lunch recess on the second day of trial, the
unmistakable odor of marijuana fills the courtroom. After
lunch, the box vanishes.15 This testimony is relevant to both the
duration and the extent of the conspiracy. On cross-
examination, the defense draws attention to the weight of the
boxes, suggesting that marijuana, normally a leafy, loose
substance, would only have this much weight when
compressed.
Following the DEA agent, the jury hears from Carl
Little, an articulate thirty-three-year-old college graduate,
born in Jamaica, who is a central figure in the conspiracy with
contacts with its leader as well as with many of the Fed Ex
employees and other couriers. We learn that he had testified in
California also. He pocketed about $25,000 in profits from his
involvement in the conspiracy, using it to pay bills and student
loans (but not taxes), and even managed to buy a $3,000
certificate of deposit. Little also had signed a cooperation
agreement in hope of a sentence lighter than the mandatory
minimum of ten years he faces, and a recommendation against
deportation to Jamaica.
Little offers the jury a glimpse into the larger
conspiracy, describing how he was recruited, and how he knew
the identity of the "stuff' he was supposed to "move" was
marijuana since that is how Jamaicans usually refer to
marijuana. He describes a pattern of deliveries, sometimes as
many as ten seventy-pound boxes as often as every day for a
few weeks. Little is a key participant who spoke to the
ringleader of the conspiracy in California as often as five to ten
times every day. During his testimony, the jury also hears a
tape recorded telephone conversation between Little and this
ringleader, a fellow Jamaican, that was conducted in Patois.
'5 I learned from the transcript that the defense stipulated that the boxes
contained marijuana so there was no more need to produce the cartons in court. While
that made the prosecutions job easier, and shortened the trial, it deprived the
government of the impact of carrying the oversized cartons into the courtroom.
200"
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The intensive period of Little's involvement in the
conspiracy lasted from about July to October of 1999, when he
transferred to another Fed Ex station in order to extricate
himself from the conspiracy. In February, however, the scheme
was in trouble because there were no Fed Ex drivers in New
York to receive the shipments. The telephone call played for
the jury (along with a transcript in both Patois and English)
relates to these problems. Little describes how the leader was
"desperate" to find someone to take the boxes. At this time,
Little recruited Cain, whom he described as being the kind of
person who would want to make some extra money and be cool
enough to keep quiet. Once Cain entered the loop, Little was
only peripherally involved.
In contrast to Cain's evasive testimony, Little testifies
forthrightly that he had told Cain that the cartons contained
marijuana, largely to reassure him that they did not contain
cocaine about which Cain had qualms. In April, Cain told Little
that there was going to be a larger than usual delivery of fifty
boxes, which was too big for Cain to handle alone, so he needed
to find another Fed Ex driver to help. He also asked Little to
pick up the boxes from both Fed Ex trucks.
Little drove a van previously rented by Cain from the
Bronx to Manhattan where he first met Cain and took twenty-
five boxes from him. From this meeting Little drove to another
location where the defendant, who was well known to Little,
arrived. Little, providing the key direct evidence linking the
defendant to the marijuana, says he was "shocked" to see Lyon.
Together they shifted the boxes to the van.
The government also plays a tape-recorded phone
conversation between Little and Lyon that occurred after
Little's arrest. The call was placed from DEA headquarters, not
to gather evidence against Lyon, but to arrange a location to
which Lyon, thinking that he was meeting Little, would go,
and then be arrested. During the conversation, Lyon complains
vehemently, but without any discernable accent, that he had
not received enough money, saying the he would not have
taken a risk of getting into trouble with the "feds" for the small
amount of money he had received from Cain. Although this
conversation is very incriminating, clearly revealing that the
defendant knew he was doing something illegal beyond merely
violating Fed Ex regulations, it also contains a key element of
[Vol. 67: 3
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the defense. During this heated exchange, Lyon refers to the
box as containing "six or seven johns." The significance of this
cryptic slang term had been alluded to during the defense
opening and would become clearer during the testimony of the
lead DEA agent the next day.
Two more law enforcement witnesses are called during
the final day of testimony. The first is a detective with a New
Jersey county prosecutor's office who, while assigned to an
investigation of marijuana distribution through Fed Ex, made
a seizure of seventy-four boxes in February, 2000. Describing
the boxes and their contents in now familiar terms, this
detective also testifies that drug dealers refer to drugs in all
sorts of code words. He also testifies that this quantity of
marijuana would be inconsistent with personal use. This
testimony is relevant to establish the duration of the
conspiracy and the amount of marijuana involved, but contains
no direct link between the marijuana and Lyon.
The final witness is Craig O'Neill, the DEA case agent
sitting at counsel table assisting the prosecutors. Unlike the
other witnesses, O'Neill provides a more complete picture of
the operation and the roles of Cain, Little, and Lyon. First, he
describes a seizure in September, 1999 of a marijuana
shipment that had followed the by now well known pattern,
but which involved none of our trial's players. These are the
other seven boxes that, combined with those described by the
first agent, add up to twenty-seven. The jury again sees
pictures of boxes, bales, and phony Fed Ex labels, and hears
about the weight of the packages and DEA procedures for
processing and testing controlled substances.
Through O'Neill, the government also introduces phone
records to and from cell phones, home phones, and pagers,
revealing many calls between Cain and Lyon both before and
after the critical date of April 10, 2000, the day when Lyon
transported the boxes and gave them to Little. The records also
show calls between Lyon and Little after the tenth, the date of
Lyon's single delivery.
Based on the promises in the opening, the cross-
examination of O'Neill is essential to the defense of lack of
knowledge. Two main points are made. First, the term "john"
may be slang for guns. In response to a defense request, O'Neill
checked out the term 'johns" by talking to some informants,
20021
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one of whom was Jamaican and confirmed that in Jamaica
"john" can be a slang reference to a type of gun used by
soldiers. Second, Cain had not mentioned Lyon's knowledge of
the marijuana until his third meeting with law enforcement
representatives when his cooperation deal was struck. Unlike
Cain, who resisted being pinned down on cross about his prior
statements that failed to mention key facts, the defense is able
to confront O'Neill with the fact that his written reports of two
earlier meetings contain no reference to Cain having told Lyon
what was in the boxes prior to the delivery.
The defendant does not testify or offer any affirmative
evidence to support his defense.
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 6
The jury instructions are largely boilerplate, given the
relative simplicity of the case. The judge instructs us about the
general rules that define and govern the duties of a jury ["You
are the sole judge of the facts." "Your recollection of the
evidence controls." "Follow all the rules and instructions."]. He
also tells us about how to consider the evidence ["Parties are
equal before the court." "Defendant is presumed innocent,"
including having no obligation to testify or put on a defense.
"Burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt."]; about the various
types of evidence [sworn testimony, exhibits, stipulations,
direct and circumstantial]; and what is not evidence [lawyers'
comments, personal feelings, knowledge gained outside the
courtroom].
The pivotal instruction concerns state-of-mind. The
judge instructs us that Lyon has to have participated in the
conspiracy with "knowledge of at least some of its purposes or
objectives and with the intention of aiding in the
accomplishment of those unlawful objectives." Here, the judge
relates this general legal principle to the facts:
16 The judge distributes to the jury individual copies of his charge which we
follow as he reads. We take the document into the jury room and are allowed to retain
[Vol. 67: 3
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I remind you that the defense in this case is that the defendant...
did not know he was agreeing to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute marijuana. It is the defense that the defendant ...
thought he was agreeing to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute guns. I remind you that he was not charged with
conspiring to distribute and posses with intent to distribute guns. If
you are not satisfied that the government has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant knew that what he was agreeing to
was to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana
you must find him not guilty of this count.
He continues with the colloquially known "ostrich charge,"
which permits the element of knowledge to be inferred from a
defendant's deliberate ignorance:'
It is not necessary for the government to prove to an absolute
certainty that a defendant knew that the drugs charged in the
indictment was [sic] marijuana. His knowledge may be established
by proof that the defendant was aware of a high probability the
boxes contained drugs. Knowledge that the boxes contained drugs
may be inferred from circumstances that would convince an average,
ordinary person that this is the fact. The government may satisfy its
burden of proving a defendant's knowledge by proof that the
defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have
been obvious to him. So if you find that the defendant acted with
reckless disregard of whether the boxes contained drugs, and acted
with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, the
requirement of knowledge would be satisfied unless the facts show
that the defendant actually believed that he was not agreeing to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute.
The judge could not be clearer. As we file into the jury
room, we each understand that our first task is to determine
whether the defendant knew the cartons contained marijuana.
Until we all agree about that, we cannot move to the other
question of his intent to participate in the larger conspiracy,
the scope of that conspiracy, or the quantity of drugs involved.
17 This instruction derives from the common law doctrine of "willful blindness"
which establishes the knowledge element of a crime from deliberate avoidance of
knowledge when a person strongly suspects criminal activity is sufficient. United
States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1226 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Scotti, 47
F.3d 1237, 1243 (2d Cir. 1995).
2002]
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III. DELIBERATIONS AND VERDICT
Not guilty. We return a verdict in less than two hours.
Even our rather abbreviated deliberations follow the
classic four step pattern described by jury researchers. First is
the orientation or ice breaking stage when jurors, nervous
about their task, become better acquainted, choose seats,
designate a foreperson, and decide procedures. This relative
cooperation cedes to the conflict stage when individuals
advocate for their sides or viewpoints, often adamantly
disagreeing. Finally, from conflict emerges consensus as jurors
compromise or abandon previous positions. The final stage is
reinforcement when a spirit of togetherness and group
supportiveness develops, affirming the sense that justice has
been done.
After we return to the jury room, we sit around a
conference table for the first time, but not in any particular
order. Until then, we had sprawled around the room, reading,
eating, chatting. Now, we were slightly more formal and much
more alert. We select Juror # 1 to be the foreperson without
much ado. Finally free to talk, our doubts spill out in a free-for-
all discussion that lasts about a half-hour with lots of cross
conversations and interruptions. The jury immediately focuses
on a single question: Lyon's knowledge of the exact nature of
the contents. It is immediately apparent that almost everyone
has at least a reasonable doubt that Lyon knew the boxes
contained marijuana. Some jurors argue for actual innocence,
believing that he did not and could not have known what was
inside.
After chaotically debating, we finally settle down to a
more organized discussion. Going around the table, each of us
expresses our views of the evidence. There is almost immediate
consensus that Cain's testimony was worthless. The jury
resents his evasive and self-serving statements. His eleventh
hour cooperation agreement is seen as opportunistic,
undermining rather than supporting his credibility. His
demeanor and motives are contrasted to Little's, who, although
much more culpable, strikes the jury as truthful. Little, we
remember vividly, described his "shock" at seeing Lyon at the
delivery, an ironic testimonial to Lyon's basic honesty. Indeed,
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Little himself had never tried to recruit Lyon, even when his
boss was desperate. From this we infer that Little never
considered Lyon to be corruptible. Since we know that this is
the only delivery in which Lyon participated, we reason that
Lyon was involved so marginally that his claim of ignorance of
the marijuana is believable.
Once Cain's testimony is disregarded, the jury asks
whether there was any other way for Lyon to have actual
knowledge of what was in the boxes. Little, the only other
source of information, never told him. We next consider the
weight. Usually marijuana is a light, leafy substance, a point
made by the defense attorney. The dense, compacted
marijuana we saw does not comport with common experience.
The defendant was more likely to have thought the contents
were electronic equipment or computers since the boxes were
described repeatedly by the government's witnesses as big
enough to hold a computer monitor. One juror suggests
counterfeit money plates, an example from left field. We also
consider the smell. Little had testified that the distinct odor of
marijuana, which some of us had smelled when the carton and
wrappings were opened in the courtroom, was undetectable
while the boxes were on the Fed Ex truck. We ask whether
Lyon's expectation of a lot of money, and his anger over not
being paid enough, imply knowledge of marijuana. No one
considers the pecuniary gain to have been substantial enough
to point conclusively to a drug conspiracy. Again, the jury fixes
on the specific knowledge required, finding the suspicion or
even awareness of some other crime is insufficient for guilt.
Finally, we ask for the transcript of the phone call in
order to assess the only available evidence of the defendant's
state of mind. Instead, the judge brings us into the courtroom
to listen to the tape again since it is the tape, not its transcript,
that is in evidence. We again hear the defendant's angry voice
refer to "six or seven johns." Back in the jury room, we talk
about how none of the prosecution witnesses were able to
provide a drug-related meaning to this term. What did Little
think Lyon meant? Even though there was testimony that drug
dealers use all kinds of code words for narcotics, neither Cain
nor Little tied "johns" to drugs. We assume they could not
provide the link or else the prosecutor would have asked.
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We take a preliminary vote now by the time-honored
custom of a secret ballot, although our discussion has stripped
most of us of anonymity. No surprise: 11-1 for acquittal. The
dynamic now changes as the one dissenter is revealed to be
juror # 4, an Orthodox Jewish woman, who defends her
position with this argument: Lyon obviously knew he was
committing a crime. He believed the boxes contained either
guns or something else illegal. After all, he was violating Fed
Ex regulations and was getting paid for his assistance. Why
should it matter that he may or may not have known the
precise identity of the contents? Not a bad argument. In fact,
most of us readily agree that he knew his conduct was illegal in
some non-specific way. Moreover, no one on the jury seems to
remember the "ostrich charge." I remind the jury of this
possible alternative but no one is willing to move on to a
discussion of this option, even though the argument of our
hold-out logically should lead to consideration of this theory of
culpability.
At this point, the jury could have become contentious.
But, instead of attacking the hold-out, making her defensive
and hardening her position, the jurors politely articulate their
reasons for doubt. Juror # 4 now reveals that on a prior jury
she was in a similar position-the only juror voting to convict.
She describes at length that robbery trial, explaining that she
was talked out of her position and finally voted to acquit,
regretting that decision ever since. Of course, everyone quickly
points out that she cannot correct the other case by convicting
this defendant."8
Inevitably, any lone voice feels the pressure to conform.
It is not easy being the only dissenter in a small room with
eleven strangers, even though no one was badgering or
hectoring her. Juror # 4 is no exception. After listening to all of
us, she formulates a version of reasonable doubt derived from
the narrowness of the judge's explanation of the charge that
the defendant had to know the specific nature of the contents,
not a generalized illegal intent. 'Well, if he has to know that
18 One of the questions asked on voir dire concerned prior jury service
including the type of case and whether a verdict was reached. But what should the
lawyers presume from this information? Possibly an amenability to deliberation and
cooperation? More likely a predisposition to convict. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 3, at
143-44. Certainly no one would have guessed this particular twist.
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exactly...." She seems reluctantly, but inexorably, drawn to
this reasoning. It is obvious to everyone that she does not have
the strength or will to persevere. Perhaps if she were a better
debater, or had more arguments to offer, or could motivate the
rest of us to look at the evidence from fresh perspectives, she
would have resisted the pressure longer, or convinced others to
change their minds. Had her resolve endured, we might have
turned into a much more obnoxious group. 9
We leave the jury room as a group, chatting nervously
about "doing the right thing," but obviously feeling relieved
and satisfied with the verdict. I am delighted that I do not have
to be the advocate for doubt since the rest of the jurors are
equally or even more inclined to acquit. This is not a traumatic
or harrowing experience for any of us, although perhaps on her
next jury, Juror # 4 once again will try to compensate for her
malleability.
IV. JURY SELECTION: How DID You GET ON A CRIMINAL
JURY?
Federal jury selection, conducted entirely by the judge,
runs on express tracks and is remarkably perfunctory. The
tradition of lawyer-conducted voir dire dedicated to educating
the jury and developing challenges for cause is sacrificed in the
service of speed, efficiency, and judicial control. In this
courtroom, as is customary throughout the district, the lawyers
submit suggested topics or questions related to the case to the
judge who then decides what to ask in addition to the
boilerplate questions posed in all cases. Our jury of twelve and
two alternates is picked in less than two hours following very
superficial questioning.
I am among the first twelve names called to the jury box
which means, given the custom in this courthouse, that I could
have been challenged at any point during jury selection until
the lawyers exhausted their respective peremptory
19 Katherine E. Finkelstein, Tempers Seem to Be Growing Shorter in Many
Jury Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001, at 1 (describing conflicts and even violence
arising during prolonged deliberations); D. Graham Burnett, Anatomy of a Verdict,
N.Y. TIMiES MAG., Aug. 26, 2001, at 32.
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challenges.0 Of course, I could have been challenged for cause,
but nothing in the voir dire established that I would be unable
to be fair and impartial, the prerequisite for such a challenge.2'
The jury quickly learns that this case involves a
marijuana distribution conspiracy so we are asked about any
connections we might have to narcotics, including
rehabilitation programs. Several prospective jurors do have
rather significant contacts with narcotics including one woman
whose brother-in-law is under indictment in California for
marijuana distribution (challenged), another whose two
brothers had been convicted of drug offenses and sentenced to
shock incarceration in New York (retained), and a third who,
while an alcoholic and substance abuser, had been arrested but
now was clean (challenged).
When we are questioned about our contacts with law
enforcement, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and lawyers generally,
I raise my hand to each of these inquiries. So did many other
jurors. The recovered alcoholic also has many close family
members who were high ranking police officers. Another juror
is the daughter of a FBI agent (challenged). Several are
employed by the police department or the department of
corrections (two are seated). The judge then turns to me and
asks first who I know in the U.S. Attorney's Office. I hesitate
over how to respond because I had worked in the office for a
year and know so many people, including the last two U.S.
Attorneys and the just appointed Interim U.S. Attorney, that I
fear I might sound self-important (and thus obnoxious to the
'0 Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b), the prosecution has six peremptory
challenges and the defense ten. Under the "struck" system of jury selection employed
in the EDNY, jurors are first challenged for cause, excused jurors are replaced on the
panel, and the examination of the replacements continues until a panel of qualified
jurors is seated. The size of this panel is twelve plus the total number of peremptories
allowed to both sides. The lawyers then exercise their peremptories until they are
exhausted. This method enabled either lawyer to have bumped me during any of the
several rounds of challenges so it clearly was not a game of "chicken" with each side
waiting to see what the other does.
21 Answering the question, "Is there any reason why you could not be fair and
impartial?" or, in my case, "Is there any reason why any of your experience would
prevent you from being fair and impartial?" is particularly daunting for lawyers. After
all, we bring a lot of knowledge into the courtroom, if not about the substantive law in
a case, at least about the rules of evidence and procedure. This baggage is impossible to
ignore, yet few people, and here I would argue that no lawyers, want to admit that they
cannot be fair.
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other jurors with whom I might have to interact). So I simply
mention that I had worked in the Civil Division of the Office in
1992-93 and that my husband had worked in the Criminal
Division from 1994-95. The judge then asks whether this
experience was the basis for my affirmative response about
knowing people in law enforcement to which I mention that I
had also worked in the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office
during the 1980s. At this point, I offer that for four years I had
been a criminal defense attorney with the Legal Aid Society.
The lawyers also hear that I teach at Brooklyn Law
School, but never learn what subjects I teach. I sit there
uncomfortably because the judge seems intent on ignoring the
fact that I have known him for twenty years since he was the
Dean of Brooklyn Law School, and that I had worked with his
wife, and taught one of his sons. I therefore volunteer that I
know the judge but never elaborate on the nature of our
relationship. I sit there wondering whether he disclosed
anything at side bar.22 The lawyers learn a few more facts
about me (and also about the other potential jurors): my
neighborhood, that I had never served on a jury before, and the
employment of my grown children.
That was the sum total of the lawyers' knowledge of me.
After the trial, I asked each of them why they had not
challenged me. The defense attorney gave his main reason:
Given the mistake/ignorance of fact defense he mounted, he
thought a law professor would understand it. He need not have
worried-everyone on the jury got that point! The prosecutor
said that she was running out of challenges and that basically I
was the lesser of evils."
As I respond to the judge's meager questions, I am
uneasy about how much relevant information is unavailable.
Which, of course, makes me wonder how much is missing from
2He did not. Probably a juror's professional and/or social acquaintance with
the trial judge would not by itself justify a challenge for cause since a social
relationship between a judge and either the lawyers or the parties is not an automatic
ground for recusal or disqualification. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 136-40 (3' ed. 2000). I wonder, however, whether the failure to
disclose the relationship might create a different problem.
2Compared to the young unemployed juror wearing a "Jay-Z" (the rapper) t-
shirt, and following defense challenges to nine white jurors, almost all of whom were
professionals, I must have seemed safe enough to the prosecutor given my apparently
balanced background which did contain more years of prosecution than defense work.
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the other jurors' profiles. Here are the experiences in my life,
any one of which could have been a rational, understandable
basis for challenging me, but none of which the jury was aware:
1. I regularly teach Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, and
occasionally have taught Federal Criminal Law, White Collar
Crime, and Trial Advocacy.
2. As a clinical teacher, I taught a Criminal Defense Clinic for six
years and a Prosecution Clinic at Brooklyn Law School for six
years. In 2000-01, I had taught a Prosecution Clinic at New
York University School of Law as an adjunct. I now teach the
Safe Harbor Project (an immigration law) Clinic. I also
supervised both our criminal and judicial externship programs
which place students in prosecution, defense, and judicial
settings in the EDNY, and offices throughout the City.
3. Having taught for more than twenty years, I have former
students working in every criminal justice agency and court in
the City, including the EDNY.
4. I began my career as a criminal defense attorney with the Legal
Aid Society, trying many narcotics cases in the early years of the
reprehensible Rockefeller drug laws.
5. Under Brooklyn District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman, I was
the Chief of the Criminal Court Bureau and then the part-time
Director of Training, a relationship that lasted for four years.
The current Brooklyn District Attorney, Charles Hynes, teaches
Trial Advocacy at the Law School, in a program I administer,
and jokingly refers to me as "his boss."
6. In 1992-93, I worked in the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's
Office in the EDNY on a sabbatical exchange program.24 My
husband, who I met while we both worked at Legal Aid, and
who teaches Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Evidence, and
Trial Advocacy at another metropolitan area law school, also
worked at the EDNY U.S. Attorney's Office in the Criminal
Division on this same exchange program. At his law school, he
teaches and administers a Trial Advocacy program in which the
current Interim U.S. Attorney for the EDNY teaches, and they
are friends.
24 Stacy Caplow, A Year in Practice: The Journal of a Reflective Clinician, 3
CLINIcAL L. REv. 1 (1996).
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7. I know professionally and personally so many present and
former AUSAs and defenders, and have worked with enough
police officers and federal agents, that it is impossible to list
them all.
8. I know personally many of the judges and magistrate judges in
the EDNY, some of whom are former deans and colleagues at
my law school. Some now teach as adjuncts, many I see at
professional and social events, and most, at one time or another,
have supervised students in the Judicial Clerkship clinical
program I administered for more than five years.
9. I have served on numerous criminal justice related Bar
Association committees with judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys.
10. I co-authored a book about federal crimes and practice.u
As a trial lawyer in this case, what inferences would I
have drawn from these many factors in deciding whether to
challenge me? Some of my background does not disqualify me
or cast doubt on my ability to serve. A law degree, which
probably included a course or two in Evidence, Criminal Law
and/or Procedure, and possibly Trial Advocacy, no longer
automatically implies an unfitness to serve or is seen as
undesirable by trial lawyers. Professional relationships,
personal acquaintances, or friendships with lawyers, even
prosecutors and defense attorneys, do not lead to bias or
partiality. Nor do my spouse's similar credentials carry much
weight.
On the other hand, clearly my knowledge of the
substantive criminal law and the criminal justice system is
broad, deep, and advanced. Solemn judicial pronouncements
about venerable legal principles, like the presumption of
innocence and reasonable doubt, produce no goosebumps of
civic responsibility since I spend many class hours attempting
to explain and demystify these concepts. Moreover, my
familiarity with the workings of police and prosecutors gives
me a much more nuanced, if not jaded, view of their activities
in investigating and prosecuting crime. Certainly, I am more
2STACY CAPLOW & LISSA GRIFFIN, MULTIDEFENDANT CRIMINAL CASES:
FEDERAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1998).
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aware of some of the technicalities of such matters as plea and
cooperation agreements, and substantial assistance letters. In
addition, my years of criminal defense work allowed me a
glimpse into the motivations and behavior of defendants faced
with serious charges.
Would any of these factors have mattered to the lawyers
had they known? It is difficult to imagine that they would be
totally irrelevant to their decision whether to exercise a
challenge, even if ultimately they let me sit. Honestly, I would
have bumped me fearing that all my knowledge about the law,
the system, and its participants would cause me to infer,
speculate, and hypothesize in order to fill in blanks that other
jurors might not even notice or consider significant. I would not
have trusted my assurances of impartiality.
Even more than lawyers, law professors are considered
experts in their fields and often testify as such, something I
have done twice. This expertise has no place in the jury room,
particularly if it competes with the judge's authority. But how
can knowledge realistically be parked outside the courtroom?
Will other jurors, at least unconsciously, value and respect a
law professor's factual arguments more highly than the
opinions of other jurors? Is a law professor's logic more reliable
after all that education and study? Can a law professor exclude
knowledge of the law that might conflict with the jury
instructions? After all, incorrect jury instructions are the very
stuff of appellate decisions. Law professors know very well that
they are often imperfect and the cause of reversal.
In 2000, the New York Court of Appeals reversed a
manslaughter conviction because a juror who was a registered
nurse expressed an opinion about the toxicology evidence in the
case based on her expertise. She became, in effect, an unsworn
expert witness." At lunch at school one day after this decision,
several of us pondered how our expertise about the law might
create similar problems on a jury. "What if I knew the judge
had charged the jury incorrectly?" asked one of my colleagues.
Should we explain a legal concept or a ruling when ordinarily
26 New York v. Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 569, 575-76, 729 N.E.2d 701, 708 N.Y.S.2d
44 (2000). Not all courts agree with this analysis. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 39 P.3d 124
(N.M. 2002) (holding that a juror's special knowledge of statistical analysis was not
"extraneous information" requiring reversal).
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the remedy for any confusion would be a supplemental
instruction. We resolved that it would be juror misconduct to
substitute our understanding of the law for the judge's. Instead
of being an unsworn witness, such an interfering juror would
be an unconstitutional judge. 7 We also concurred, however,
that we could not ignore the problem. We brainstormed, albeit
inconclusively, about possible ways to intervene without
disrupting the natural deliberation process by imposing our
purported expertise which might either cause reversible error
or get us into trouble, or both. The situation is fraught with
risk to the integrity of the system however it is handled.
After reflecting about the peculiar decision to retain me
on the jury, I draw some lessons. First, the entire voir dire
process is not very calculated. It is still highly intuitive,
superficial, and time pressured, so that it is probably a mistake
to attribute too much deliberation and logic to the process of
jury selection. Also, impartiality can take different forms.
Although I have more information and opinions about the
criminal law and its processes, they probably are more
balanced as a result of my history than the layperson whose
information and biases are drawn from the media or limited
personal experience. Unlike many jurors with no preconceived
notions, I had plenty, but they concerned both sides and all
aspects of the case.
V. Do RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SEX ACTUALLY MATTER IN
THE JURY ROOM?
Distracted by the novelty of my own unexpected jury
service, I did not really pay attention to the overall jury
composition until later in the trial. A lot has been asserted,
either explicitly or implicitly, in the explosion of cases about
the misuse of race (and now nationality and gender, and
perhaps someday sexual orientation, religion, or age) in the
27 On one occasion, a Manhattan judge vacated a verdict after a lawyer-juror
gave his fellow jurors an incorrect legal definition in a civil trial. David Rhode, supra
note 2, at 6.
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exercise of peremptory challenges.28 Not only do discriminatory
peremptories constitute a denial of equal protection, but also
diversity of viewpoint is believed to advance more open,
democratic, impartial deliberation."
The Eastern District of New York comprises a
geographically large, heterogeneous area including Brooklyn,
Queens, Staten Island, and the Long Island counties, Nassau
and Suffolk. While the first two counties are economically,
racially, and ethnically diverse, densely populated urban areas,
the latter three are suburban, more racially and socio-
economically homogeneous. Juries for both courthouses in the
District (one in Brooklyn, the other on central Long Island) are
drawn from all five counties.0 Judging from the crowd in the
central jury room, the resulting jury pool mirrors the racial and
ethnic composition of the District.31
My petit jury reflects this diversity based on
appearances alone. The jury of fourteen (twelve regular and
two alternate jurors) consists of nine people of color and five
whites; eleven are women and three are men. Of the three
men, two are African-American, and one is Hispanic. All of the
white jurors are women; one is Romanian born, and one is a
religious Jew. One alternate is of Indian background. Of the
five remaining women, three were born in the Caribbean
(Jamaica, Haiti, and Guyana). Although their nationalities
quite properly are not revealed during jury selection, two speak
with recognizable accents.
28 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), made unconstitutional using
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis of race. See also J.E.B.
v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
29 In the landmark Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Supreme
Court said that only juries "representative" of the community, a "fair cross section,"
can be truly impartial. Impartiality, therefore, embraces diversity and difference,
enhancing the quality of deliberation. The verdict becomes more legitimate if the
product of a variety of viewpoints.
30 In 1995, a proposal to change the jury selection plan in the EDNY was
approved permitting jurors from all five counties to be summoned to jury duty at both
courthouses. Under the prior system, a pool was summoned from only two counties for
the Long Island courthouse in contrast to all five for the Brooklyn courthouse. In re
Jury Plan of E. Dist. of New York, 61 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 1995).
3' Michael Cooper & Elissa Gootman, Diversity Here and There, Not
Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2001, at Li; Susan Sachs, The Census/New York;
City Population Tops 8 Million in Census Count for First Time, Mar. 16, 2001, at Al;
Janny Scott, Boroughs' Rise Driven Largely By Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2001, at Al.
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Professionally, the group is unremarkable. There is a
mix of educational background, type of job, and level of
responsibility. A few jurors are either retired or homemakers.
The jury is fairly evenly split between the urban and suburban
counties, although many had to travel considerable distances
to the courthouse. None of the jurors are particularly young-
no college students or people obviously in their twenties. Our
ages range from the late thirties to the sixties. Most have
grown children.
Do any of these factors matter in the jury room? We all
treat each other respectfully and are friendly throughout the
four days. There are no cliques, or lunch groups based on any
discernable characteristics, and we all share small talk while
waiting. We joke, compare commutes to the courthouse, and
chat a little about work and families. Coincidentally, one
juror's daughter was in my husband's Evidence class last
semester. During deliberations, the polite harmony that had
been the norm during the first three days continues. Each
person's opinion is heard, although some jurors have less to say
than others.32 On the surface, none of our different perspectives
interferes with our ability to cooperate or influences our
decisions.
There are two distinct, although not particularly vital,
ways in which personal beliefs and background surface during
deliberations. First, several of the jurors react somewhat
emotionally, although not irrationally, to the responsibility of
convicting a presentable, respectful young man whose
involvement in this large conspiracy was so minimal. The
women and men jurors express these emotions differently. In
the women, these sentiments are quite maternal and
protective, reluctant to convict such a nice man for such a
small misstep, therefore demanding more solid evidence in
order to reach a guilty verdict. The reaction of the men is more
impatiently practical. A few of them comment how little Fed Ex
paid even its longstanding employees and how petty crime
seemed rampant in the company as a result, as if the
32 Since the jury consisted of nine voluble women and three more reticent men,
the dynamics of this jury were inconsistent with findings of some researchers that men
tend to dominate deliberation discussions. See, e.g., HASTIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 31-
32; Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593, 594-
98 (1987).
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marijuana smuggling were similar to stealing pens or postage.
Rather than sounding wistful or burdened by a grave
responsibility, the men are impatient with the scarcity of the
evidence and the incredibility of one of the cooperators. They
want to express their opinions, articulate their doubts, and
finish quickly."
Race, ethnicity, and nationality play a more overt role
during deliberations. Since the vast majority of the
conspirators were Jamaican, the arguments of a Jamaican
woman, the foreperson as it turned out, have a big impact. She
imports into the jury room her knowledge of the customs and
attitudes of Jamaicans about marijuana to support her
argument that it is unlikely that the defendant knew the boxes
contained marijuana. For example, she authoritatively tells the
jury, and several others nod in recognition of her point, that
Jamaicans do not think of or refer to marijuana as "drugs" so it
was unlikely that the defendant thought he was carrying
marijuana, even if he might have thought there were other
kinds of drugs in the boxes. Her knowledge, she explains, was
gleaned from interactions with Jamaican teenagers, and, other
personal experiences. Her authoritativeness is quite compelling
and is bolstered by the other Caribbean women. Two of these
women are the most dominant voices during deliberations and,
because neither was offensive or domineering, their views are
very persuasive. Although neither of these women explicitly
appealed to emotion, they seem to have reached a decision
based on a previously held world view to which they conform
the evidence. Their anecdotal personal experience informs their
judgment and other jurors tend to understand, or at least
accept, the images they paint.
Given the long list of facts the lawyers and the judge
failed to elicit about my background, presumably there were
just as many unknowns about the other jurors. Given the
federal voir dire system on routine cases such as this, the
lawyers' decisions to challenge a juror is based on very limited
facts encouraging stereotyping. Some of these hidden
In Jeffrey T. Frederick's, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY, supra
note 3, at 278, the author observes that men tend to make statements that are more
task oriented while women make statements that are emotionally supportive, aimed at
reducing tension.
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influences and values affected their analysis of the evidence
and the witnesses.
Today, of course, peremptory challenges are carefully
monitored to avoid race or sex discrimination. When I thought
about our jury afterwards, reacting to the influence of the two
Caribbean women, I first wondered how the lawyers could have
left them on the jury. Their accents were so recognizable.
Keeping me seemed a very questionable decision, but why
didn't the lawyers realize that a Jamaican woman might have,
or think she might have, specialized, almost expert, opinions
about Jamaican drug trafficking conspiracyT. After voicing my
incredulity several times, I stopped short, astonished at my
own blindness and lack of perspicacity. Wrapped up as I was in
post-trial exuberance, I had forgotten that any challenge to
these jurors would be illegal, given the paucity of other
information available to the lawyers. Absent other neutral
explanations that the lawyers could cite-and there were none
obvious given the skeletal voir dire-the only grounds for
challenging them would have been their race and/or
nationality, a constitutional violation.
The paradox of the Batson line of cases came to life on
my jury.35 Lawyers cannot exercise challenges based on certain
categories, yet these very characteristics inevitably alter the
jury dynamics and inform deliberations. Nationality, which in
this instance, conflated with race and ethnicity, mattered a
great deal, perhaps disproportionately, in shaping our
deliberations and reaching a verdict. Was this so terrible? In
some fashion, every juror brings into the jury room personal
judgments and values that are derived from life experience.
Yet, even if what happened in this trial was predictable,
peremptories on this basis alone would be improper.
Fortunately, our jurors argued rationally and non-dogmatically
so their theories were not offensive or preemptive of other
viewpoints, but our ambience might have changed over time if
our conflict stage had lasted longer.
Although not a trained expert like the nurse in Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 569, she
came close to being an unsworn witness since no one openly questioned her knowledge,
its source or its accuracy, and her opinions carried considerable weight.
35 See authority cited supra note 28.
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Does judge controlled, highly restricted voir dire create
more problems than it solves? In its favor clearly are efficiency
and speed. Only a few people with personal commitments,
physical impediments or, in one instance, obvious
disorientation, were immediately excused. No one was
challenged for cause. This method communicates an affirming
attitude about jury duty that implies inclusion and a
presumption of fitness and impartiality. This has led critics of
the system, such as Justice Marshall, to urge the abolition of
the peremptory challenge,36 and others to argue that seating
the first twelve jurors seated in the box advances democracy
since their selection is truly random.
Extensive voir dire hunts for flaws and exposes biases, a
process that can feel insulting and insinuating to the jurors.
Often, the resulting jury will be the least objectionable to all
parties, a pretty bland lowest common denominator. And even
at their most probing, do the lawyers ever really weed out
bigotry, prejudice, bias, preconceptions, or partiality, or does
the process simply guarantee that some people will feel
mysteriously "chosen" or "selected" while others feel excluded?
It is difficult, nevertheless, to relinquish the received wisdom
that extensive lawyer voir dire produces a more impartial
jury.38 Without inquiry, personal details that might have
considerable bearing on deliberations, and might even provide
grounds for a challenge for cause, are unrevealed. These
36 Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
31 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995) (peremptory challenges should be eliminated). In
one of my first felony trials, my opponent from the Manhattan District Attorney's
Office loudly announced that he had no challenges for any of the jurors because, in his
view, any citizen of N.Y. County, not subject to a challenge for cause, was qualified and
welcome to serve, leaving me to be the heavy in the jurors' eyes. His gesture felt like
insincere grandstanding at the time but maybe the problem was more his arrogant
behavior than his claim about the system.
38 For general discussions espousing open-ended voir dire as the best vehicle to
obtain an impartial jury see, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY
SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 150-51 (1994); Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir
Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975). A less supportive
conclusion is reached in Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire An Effective
Procedure for the Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 721-26 (1991)
(concluding that attorney-conducted voir dire is not effective but finding that jurors
answer more candidly to an attorney than a judge). For a discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of lawyer-conducted voir dire see JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 53-56
(G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997).
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attitudes risk diverting or derailing the deliberative process,
delegitimizing whatever verdict is reached, and possibly
interfering with consensus.
The federal system does not abandon tradition entirely,
but its abbreviated, impersonal, narrowly focused questions
neither expose real impartiality nor permit the development of
neutral grounds for exercising peremptories. In the end, our
jury has no crackpots or extremists, but that good fortune was
a lucky accident, not the result of a process that worked
rationally or effectively.
VI. Do JURIES UNDERSTAND AND FOLLOW THE LAW?
A. Admonitions About the Boundaries of Role
Jurors learn about the law from the judge. Throughout
the case, a trial judge frequently admonishes a jury to perform
or refrain from certain conduct prior to its deliberations. The
classic directions are to resist: talking about the case during
the trial amongst themselves or with anyone else, forming an
opinion about the verdict, speculating about what takes place
during bench conferences, or drawing inferences about the
absence of witnesses, including the defendant. I assume that
most jurors take seriously these commands despite the strong
temptation to talk about the testimony and the witnesses while
impressions are still fresh.
Our jury obeys the judge's directions, although there are
several jurors who were itching to talk about their feelings
about particular aspects of the case and have to be reminded
by others of this warning. Juror emotions surface on the matter
of punishment, too. Although the judge had interrogated us
about our attitude toward marijuana, reminding us that it was
an illicit drug, and certainly, given the enormous amount of
marijuana involved, no one considers this conspiracy to be
anything other than serious, the matter of punishment affects
most of us. We all realize that punishment is the province of
the judge, but the testimony had made clear that the defendant
faces a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years to life. This
had been the unacceptable risk faced by Cain and Little that
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had motivated their cooperation agreements. The jurors feel
that this is unfair and most do not even try to hide this
attitude. This information makes a conviction even more
unlikely since no one thinks Lyon, even if guilty, deserves more
punishment than either Cain or Little. 9
Some jurors import personal values and knowledge into
the jury room. The Jamaican mother talks about her
community, her son's experiences, her own. One of the men
also generalizes from obvious familiarity with marijuana,
talking about "most people," and "whenever..." in a way that
more than hints at personal experience. The defense argument
that marijuana is usually thought of as a light, leafy substance,
not the densely packed bricks that fit inside sixty plus pound
cartons, easily persuades many jurors, another sign of
familiarity with this drug.
Given the proclivity of eleven of the jurors to acquit
from the very outset of deliberations, all of us obviously had
been thinking about the case during the week, contrary to the
judge's caution to refrain from reaching any conclusions until
the end of the evidence and the instructions. If my own
situation is at all representative, I felt after the first day of
testimony that the prosecution had a weak case and unless
some more damaging evidence was produced, I would have
trouble convicting. Almost from the beginning, I have enough
doubt that is "reasonable," and since I know the burden of
proof already, I question whether the government could ever
convince me to convict. From the occasional mutterings of a few
jurors, I sense that others share my misgivings. While we are
not incorrect to hold the government to its burden of proof, I
suspect that many of us listened to the testimony skeptical
that the burden ever could be satisfied. Our shared
predisposition to acquit shapes the environment of the jury
room as soon as we begin deliberations. We really do not need
to make arguments to convince each other of a particular
verdict. Rather, we hasten to give expression to all of the
opinions and viewpoints that we had to silence during the days
of testimony.
39 As it happens, Lyon might have been able to avoid the mandatory minimum
sentence under the 'safety valve" provisions of the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, but
none of the jurors, including me, was aware of this possibility.
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After a sleepless night prior to our day of deliberations,
it is a relief to learn that so many jurors share my views. Yet, I
worry that they are too hasty, too anxious to go home. For
example, nobody even seems to notice or comment on the
disappearance of the possession count." No one plays the
standard roles of devil's advocate or hold-out. No one advocates
that we should prolong our deliberations for the purpose of
airing all possible theories or arguments. Even our one
dissenter is incapable of forcing the others to persist since she
lacks the stamina and the skill to sustain her position through
debate or discussion.
B. Instructions on the Law
The judge so decisively narrowed the issue for us that
we have no trouble following the law. We only consider one
question: Did the defendant know there was marijuana in the
boxes? If the judge had not been so concise and clear, or if the
law had required only that he know there was some kind of
drugs inside, our verdict might have been different. Having a
reasonable doubt about his knowledge of the marijuana does
not necessarily mean that anyone accepts his gun story. Some
believe he may have thought there were drugs inside, but the
judge said "marijuana" not just any drug. That instruction
confines our deliberations so conclusively that our task is
unambiguous and simple.
Frankly, I was, and continue to be, confused by this
instruction. I had thought that the federal narcotics conspiracy
statute does not require proof of a specific type of drug, just
40 The second count was dismissed prior to the jury instructions on venue
grounds since the marijuana that constituted the possession had no connection to the
EDNY. Both the Fed Ex distribution center where the package had been shipped and
the location where Little removed the boxes from Lyon's van were in Manhattan (the
Southern District of New York).
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any narcotic on the schedule.41 Indeed, the prosecutor's
summation says:
The law says that if the defendant thought there was drugs in the
boxes, then he is guilty. He did not have to know that it was
marijuana, leaf, ganja, whatever you want to call it. He didn't have
to know it was that sort of drug. He had to know it was a drug.
Yet, the entire defense, as supported by the judge's
instruction, constrains the jury to knowledge of marijuana
only. We never address the possibility that Lyon might have
thought the cartons contained another kind of drug since there
was no evidence in the case that the conspiracy might have
involved other drugs. Indeed, Cain's concern that there might
be cocaine in the boxes was quickly squelched by Little,
according to both of their testimony. We feel that we do not
have to decide what else he might have thought was in the
boxes, only whether he believed they contained marijuana.
Given what I thought the law required, I am really
perplexed but never consider raising my confusion in light of
the judge's unequivocal instruction and how it structures our
deliberations. I have the same information from the judge as
all of the other jurors. They are not confused so I stay quiet and
simply followed the extremely clear instructions like everyone
else. This reminds me of our faculty lunch conversation about
the difficulty of substituting our understanding of the law for
the judge's. I feel constrained not only to follow the
instructions, but to keep my concerns to myself. Perhaps I rely
on the prestige of the federal court, confident that, unlike other
courts where the quality of practice is lower, the judges and
4' The law appears to be well settled that a defendant charged with a violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) does not have to know the exact nature of the drug possessed. See,
e.g., United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cheung,
836 F.2d 729, 731 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Gonzalez, 700 F.2d 196, 201 (5th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 508, 512 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Morales, 577 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1978). Federal Jury Instruction 56-6 states in
pertinent part:
Although the government must prove that the defendant knew that he
possessed narcotics, the government does not have to prove that the
defendant knew the exact nature of the drugs in his possession. It is
enough that the government proves that the defendant knew that he
possessed some kind of narcotic.
3 L. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (2001).
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lawyers here do not make such fundamental mistakes. I am
reticent to inteiject my interpretation, insecure about my
knowledge of the law without double checking, but quick legal
research obviously is out of the question.42
Reading the transcript reveals a surprise. Following
procedure, the lawyers had submitted suggested instructions to
the judge, then, prior to summations, the judge reviewed his
proposed jury charge with the lawyers outside the hearing of
the jury.43 He listened to their requests for specific changes of
terms, phrases, and concepts. Although the language of the
judge's ultimate instruction was unambiguous, and was taken
at face value by the jury, this language may not have reflected
accurately either the judge's intent or the understanding of the
lawyers. When the judge reads from his proposed instruction
he says:
[W]ith respect to knowledge in this regard it is the defendant's
contention that he did not know that what was in the boxes he
agreed to transport in his truck and turn over to somebody else was
marijuana. It's his contention he believed that the contents of the
boxes was guns and not marijuana. It might be drugs instead of
marijuana, but we are talking about marijuana. If you find that the
defendant did not know he had drugs in his possession, did not know
what he possessed was, in fact, drugs, you must find him not
guilty. . . . In this regard, I charge you that the defendants
knowledge may be established by proof that the defendant was
42 1 later learn from one of the lawyers that my uncertainty may derive from
the confusion spawned by the recent Supreme Court decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that "foither than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. In
narcotics cases, the question is still unresolved whether the amount of drugs involved
is an element of the offense that must be pleaded in the indictment, submitted to the
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 204
F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. granted and remanded, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001), vacated en
bane, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 26431 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2001) (holding that quantity is an
element of drug offense that must be pleaded and proved); see also United States.v.
Jones, 235 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that failure to include drug quantity in
indictment and to present question to jury violates Apprendi); United States v.
Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding § 841(b) quantity-based sentence
enhancements unconstitutional), petition for rehg en bane granted, 2001 U.S. APP.
LEXIS 20432 (9th Cir., Sept. 14, 2001); but see United States v. Bjorkman, 279 F.3d
482 (7th Cir. 2001). The judge gave an "Apprendi" charge with respect to quantity
and perhaps he was being cautious about whether Apprendi also might apply to type of
drug, another sentencing factor.
43 FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
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aware of a high probability that the boxes contained marijuana
unless despite this high probability the evidence show that the
defendant actually believed that he did not possess drugs. Okay?
4
Neither of the lawyers objected to this proposed
language even though the judge referred to marijuana and
drugs almost interchangeably. His final, even more
unequivocal formulation, inexorably structured the jury's
understanding of its mission, and guided us to our verdict more
than any other aspect of the case. Some of the jurors might
have been convinced by the circumstantial evidence that Lyon
knew there were some kind of drugs in the boxes but for the
precise wording of this instruction which led us away from this
possibility. This microcosmic example suggests that juries do
indeed follow the letter of the law, particularly when it pulls
them in a direction it is predisposed to go.
C. Do Jurors Speculate Outside the Evidence?
In his charge, the judge cautioned us that the only
evidence to consider was that heard in the courtroom. Of
course, we all refer to our own common sense derived from
personal experience to assess credibility, accept facts, and draw
inferences. There are very few unanswered questions in this
case. Two occur to me, but I have no idea how much the other
jurors speculate since we do not discuss either. First, this
conspiracy involved more people. We know that the kingpin
was prosecuted in California because Little says he also
cooperated there. We see some pictures of other conspirators
but have no idea what happened to any of them. I believe we
all tacitly understand that they had all been convicted, but
cannot guess whether they had pled guilty or gone to trial.
Nevertheless, I, and probably some others, fill in the blanks.
Richard Lyon was such a minor participant in the overall
scheme, I guess that he is the only person who was unwilling to
plead guilty. That assumption leads me, and probably some
others, once again to feel sorry for the defendant who seems
the least culpable of the lot. I guess that the government pled
down the case, but that this defendant was so low on the totem
" (emphasis added).
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pole that he had nothing to offer in exchange for favorable
treatment. Even without taking the stand to present his
version of the events, I conjecture that he declined a tempting
guilty plea, thereby implicitly bolstering his claim of innocence
given the punishment he faces. For me, this reaffirms the
strength of his case, a reaction that is pure speculation, of
course.
Richard Lyon did not testify. Although I do not say
anything because the judge tells us that he has a right not to
put on a defense, I think I know why: He has a criminal record.
This is lawyer-think. None of the others jurors even wonder
aloud about his silence because the core of his defense is so
successfully communicated through the government's
witnesses. Because I genuinely feel that prior convictions have
no bearing on current charges, I do not find it difficult to ignore
my explanation for his silence. Moreover, as a seasoned
criminal practitioner, I know that a defendant often risks more
than he gains by testifying. His defense has been established
effectively through the government's witnesses, so why
endanger his case by subjecting himself to cross-examination?
He could be asked about "johns" and have no ready, or truthful,
explanation. His demeanor might be alienating.
I really jumped to the wrong conclusion. I later learn
that a controversial ruling by the judge kept him from taking
the stand. The defendant had tried to enter a guilty plea but
could not be properly allocuted under Rule 11, 45 leaving the
government no choice but to try the case or dismiss (a highly
improbable option). Although the admissions in his failed
guilty plea allocution are inadmissible on the case-in-chief, the
judge held that the statements could be introduced to impeach
him. Apparently, his partial admissions had been damaging
enough to undermine his defense and to deter him from taking
the stand. So my inference, based on my background, was all
wrong. Our natural inclination is to refer to our own experience
and understanding of behavior to fill in the blanks, but that
tendency can yield incorrect assumptions. This is a lesson I
often teach clinic and Trial Advocacy students, and my own
45 FED. IL CRIM. P. 11(f) requires the court to make inquiry about the factual
basis of a defendant's guilt. Here, the defendant would not admit knowledge of the
marijuana so the judge refused to accept a guilty plea.
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mistaken conclusions make this point vividly. None of the
other jurors, ignorant of "real life," even mention his failure to
testify or speculate why he did not tell his own story.
D. Do Jurors Employ the "Story Model" of Decision
Making?
The "story model" of juror decision making is a popular
theory advanced by jury psychologists that jurors: (1) impose a
narrative story structure to evaluate the evidence; (2) identify
verdict category attributes, basically the elements of the legal
claim; and then (3) find the verdict that best matches the story
they prefer. 6 Others have built on the claims of this model by
causally connecting jury psychology and advocacy." By
understanding this cognitive process, lawyers can build
persuasive stories that juries can adopt.
Although our trial was relatively straightforward, there
were still stories to tell. The acquittal is a tribute to the
effective narrative presented by the defense-without even
putting on any witnesses, or having any affirmative supportive
evidence. It is a defense of smoke and mirrors, of compounded
inferences, requiring a sympathetic jury to buy into the claim
in the first place. Of course, the theory of the defense was very
risky---"I knew something illegal was going on, and guessed
guns were involved. I may have committed some other crime
(attempted possession of weapons), but not the crime charged."
By acknowledging his stupidity, greed, and dishonesty, the
defense strategy was daring. In essence, the jury had to buy a
cynical version of criminal justice that says, "Richard Lyon is a
criminal, but just not this criminal," so he deserves acquittal.
And, we will have to acquit without ever hearing Lyon's story
in his own words, which means that the defense will have to
extract convincing evidence of his story from the government's
case.
46 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 3; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 22-23.
47 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing
Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992); Philip N. Meyer, 'Desperate for
Love III": Rethinking Closing Arguments as Stories, 50 S.C. L. REV. 715 (1999).
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This is quite a gamble, conceding from the outset that
Richard Lyon is flawed, painting him as a criminal, but just
not guilty of this crime. The jury has to be very forgiving and
understanding about the legal technicality that a person can be
convicted of only the crime charged. Since he was not charged
with a weapons conspiracy or possession (impossible since no
weapons were involved), he could not be guilty of those specific
crimes despite his general culpability. This strategy depended
on the narrow instructions given by the judge concerning
specific knowledge and the jury's acceptance of those
restrictions. After all, we all could have reasoned like Juror # 4
who was so loathe to acquit someone who admitted to some
kind, but not the right kind, of criminal activity. When I later
describe the defense to others, they laugh at how foolish and
preposterous it sounds. I guess you had to be there, since it
made sense to the jury.
We are given a few tools by the defense from the
beginning. The opening sneaks in a lot of argument48 and
manages to plant the seeds of the defense theory effectively.49
The defense attorney says:
Now, at the end of this case you may very well find that Richard
Lyon did something wrong, that Richard Lyon did something he
should be ashamed about, that Richard Lyon did something for
which he should be fired, but you are not going to find that Richard
Lyon knew or believed that there was marijuana in those boxes.
These promises are kept for the most part. Cain, whose
testimony is supposed to establish Lyon's knowledge, is
impeached so effectively that the jury entirely disregards his
testimony. The defense uses both Little and O'Neill to bolster
this impeachment. The phone conversation is another part of
the story. It is the only opportunity the jury has to hear Lyon's
48 An opening statement, often compared to a table of contents or a road map,
forecasts the evidence, and is not an argument or statement of personal opinions. See,
e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQuES 61-93 (5th ed. 2000). During the defense
attorney's opening, the prosecution objected and the judge intervened many times
reminding him that he should not argue his case.
Robert K. Bothwell, Social Cognition in the Courtroom: Juror Information
Processing and Story Construction, in HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 17-3 to 17-8
("Opening statements that are well-organized overviews of the upcoming trial events
may provide jurors with a thematic framework, or schema, that will influence their
evaluation of the evidence...").
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own words, to get a glimpse of him as a person. Although
inculpatory, his words are also ambiguous in a context in
which it would be reasonable to expect more self-incrimination.
From O'Neill, the jury hears about the possible connotation of
"johns." In retrospect, however, there really is no actual
evidence of the defense theory other than these wisps from
which the defense cleverly sews together a plausible version of
the events.
During deliberations, the jury considers Lyon's story
within the strictures of the judge's instruction. We see him as a
young man with very bad judgment and questionable morals
who made a stupid mistake." We never discuss whether it
made sense for him to think the cartons contained guns, but
several jurors offer creative alternative contents that make
more sense than marijuana such as electronic equipment,
computer equipment, appliances, or even counterfeit money
plates. Even if these other items might be stolen, we want to
find less blameworthy illegal contents than guns, which
implicitly demonstrates our discomfort with acquitting
someone who believed he was profiting from transporting
firearms. We want to find a more forgivable explanation.
Eventually, we remember that we do not need to determine
what he did believe was in the boxes, only whether the
government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he
believed marijuana was inside.
The government, however, does not offer a counter-story
to the defendant's claim of ignorance, nor do the prosecutors
knit together the evidence the jury has heard piecemeal.
Ironically, the prosecution witnesses plant the seed of an
alternate story by repeatedly and consistently comparing the
cartons to packing large enough for computers, the kind of
heavy object that actually might be inside a box this size. The
government's summation simply asserts and concludes what
Lyon must have known, but does not relate a story of its own or
provide an argument to allow the story to mesh with the law.
The prosecutor relies on characterizations such as the "plain
and simple" fact that Lyon broke the law even if he only
so Before we left the jury room, the defense attorney comes in to say thank
you. One of the jurors tells him how lucky his client is and urges him to talk to Lyon
about his close brush with disaster.
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committed one act, or that it would be "somewhat ridiculous" to
deny his awareness that others were involved besides Cain,
and that the boxes were filled with drugs. The government
summation offers analogies and parables but no fact-based
accounts based on any recognizable schema."1 None of these
images resonate with the jurors as such rhetoric should.
Because the defense does not dispute his involvement in
a scheme to use Fed Ex to transport illegal goods in violation of
Fed Ex regulations, we know there was a larger conspiracy
taking place. But since we begin-and end-with the question
of knowledge, we can basically ignore all of the law
enforcement testimony about other deliveries and other
conspirators. In addition, the AUSA does not use the
summation to tie together this testimony or explain its
significance. The calculations of the aggregate weight of all of
the deliveries which preceded Lyon's involvement were
confusing and the link to Lyon sufficiently vague that the
summation needed to connect the dots more thoroughly.
With the benefit of hindsight, I wonder why the
government did not tell a simpler story. If the defendant was
charged only with a conspiracy to distribute the marijuana in
the boxes on April 10 (a considerable amount that might have
yielded an adequate punishment anyway), and if the
government had focused more sharply on what Lyon must have
known in order to take part on that single day, perhaps the
jury could have been convinced differently. The other law
enforcement agent's distracting testimony about other
shipments, seizures, and individuals, therefore, could have
been eliminated.
To do this, the government could have relied on its
stronger witnesses, leading with Little and finishing with
O'Neill to describe the core facts, and could have reduced the
negative impact of Cain's testimony by sandwiching him in the
middle. Instead of hearing Cain's equivocations about whether
and when he told Lyon about the marijuana, and concentrating
51 For example, the AUSA analogizes participating in a conspiracy to being
employed by the Department of Justice with its ever changing personnel, including the
Attorney General; offers a parable about how her young niece ate a birthday cake but
was "man enough" to admit her wrongdoing, and asserts that everyone knows a blue
Tiffany's box contains jewelry even if it is closed. These disjointed images do not
connect to a coherent theory.
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on Cain's inconsistent statements to the agents, Little would
have related how Cain did know what was in the boxes. Lyon
was doing exactly what so many others had done before to
assist in the conspiracy-with full knowledge of the contents of
the boxes. Lyon incredibly was the only person in the
conspiracy who claimed ignorance of the cartons' contents, and
would have been believably portrayed as an "ostrich" who
probably did know what the boxes contained. O'Neill could be
the disinterested law enforcement officer who diligently
followed up the defense request for investigation but whose
findings were inconclusive at best, instead of the somewhat
desperate case agent who finally was able to extract an
admission from Cain that was damaging to Lyon. This could
have been the story of a tragic misstep whose inspiration was
greed and easy money (borne out by the tone and contents of
the tape) that indeed was "plain and simple" criminal conduct.
By presenting us with the big picture, when this defendant was
so low on the totem pole as to be underground, the jury did not
have the heart to convict, particularly given our knowledge of
the sentencing consequences, without substantially more
evidence.
In retrospect, the defense did a remarkable job of
weaving a story from flimsy threads pulled from the much
more tightly woven prosecution case. It might well be that the
defense amounted to no more than the "Emperor's new
clothes," illusory and insubstantial. Yet, such a story told to a
more than receptive audience, a jury heading toward acquittal,
gave us the arguments we needed to reach our verdict.
CONCLUSION
A novelty-yes. An oddity-yes. But did a criminal law
professor with a criminal practice career serving on a criminal
jury influence or alter the dynamic or the outcome of the case?
Did my presence make a difference?" No-neither the process
nor the verdict was distorted or even affected.
During the trial, I worry about how the jurors perceive
me. I want to be neither an authority figure nor a leader. I do
52 David Rhode, Do Diplomas Make Jurors Any Better? Maybe Not, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at B1.
[Vol. 67: 3
AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM COMES TRUE
not want to have a disproportionate influence. From time to
time while we wait, jurors ask me questions about the legal
system such as what would happen if we do not reach a verdict
or how the grand jury operates. When deliberations begin, I sit
quietly until many of the jurors express their views.
My concerns are groundless, and perhaps self-
important, exaggerating the significance of my legal training
and experience. The jurors never look to me for information,
clarification, or leadership. I only once self-consciously engage
my co-jurors from a perspective that draws on my legal
training and awareness when I redirect the discussion to take
into account an idea that I thought the jury was ignoring and
which I thought they should consider in order to reach a just,
legitimate decision. I draw their attention to the "ostrich
charge" to make sure we evaluate his claim of ignorance from
all directions. Until then, the jury was overlooking and
ignoring this alternate option of inferring knowledge. This was
the only aspect of the deliberations in which I set the course of
the discussion, and my colleagues are not in the least
enthusiastic about considering this possibility. They basically
ignore my comments. Perhaps if I had intervened or been more
assertive the interactions might have been more imbalanced,
but there was so much consensus that no redirection from
anyone was necessary. There were 'so many articulate,
assertive individuals who expressed their ideas logically and
sensibly that my professional training was superfluous.
In retrospect, what was the big deal? Since everyone I
know was astonished at my news of being on a jury, I just want
them to know we law professors are just regular folks who take
the job seriously. Unlike many citizens, for us, jury service is
not a burden, but a precious gift, a wish come true.
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